A little over a year ago, international food prices were at a record level. In the second half of 2008, they declined almost as fast as they rose. Almost, but not quite. Many forgot that food prices actually started to increase in 2001, not in early 2008 or late 2007. What didn’t help also was the global financial crisis, which burst on the scene in full force in September 2008. In many headlines, one crisis replaced another. In many households, one crisis came on top of another.
International food prices are still high compared to 2005 – let alone to 2000. The FAO cereal price index was in May 2009 still 55 percent above the 2005 level and 120 percent above the 2000 level.
Food prices at the local level did not and have not followed the international changes on a one-for-one basis. Several factors play a role, including import dependency, trade barriers, policy measures and exchange rate movements.
At the local level, FAO estimates that in 80 percent of the countries with data, food prices are still higher than 12 months ago. WFP estimates that the cost of the staple food basket was in the first quarter of 2009 more than 20 percent more expensive than the 5-year average in three quarters of the countries in which we monitor food prices.
Why is this important? Food prices are very important because they partly determine how much and what we eat. There is quite a bit of evidence that households who spend 50 to 80 percent of their expenditures on food, which is very common in developing countries, reduce the consumption of nutritious foods when food prices increase. They might maintain the consumption of staples and of caloric intake, but they reduce the consumption of such items as final products and green-leafy vegetables.
Through those changes, micronutrient deficiencies and malnutrition increase. And when these changes in food consumption happen before the age of 24 months, they are likely to be irreversible. A child who is stunted at the age of two is stunted for life. There is now significant evidence that inadequate nutrition at a young age impairs cognitive development, reduces learning capacity, leads to health problems and reduces their productivity. We also know that inadequate food and nutrition leads to reduced immunity and higher morbidity and mortality.
Vulnerable households are now also facing a decline in incomes and jobs – on top of high food prices – as a result of the global economic and financial crisis as export volumes and prices decline, capital flows dry up and remittances fall.
Should we call this a crisis? I think so. A crisis relays a sense of urgency and the need for immediate action. And that is exactly what is needed. Because the window of opportunity for small children is so small – basically stretching from conception to 24 months – action is urgently required. There is also a need for comprehensive action because there now more than 1 billion people hungry and more than 2 billion people are suffering from micronutrient deficiencies. The scale of the problem is huge, and worsening in the current environment of high food prices and a global economic and financial crisis.
This is not a crisis that leads immediately to large numbers of violent deaths. But it does lead to suffering and to higher mortality. The crisis of hunger and malnutrition – in the case of micronutrient deficiencies often referred to as “hidden hunger” – is more subtle and its effects less noticeable. It is a crisis nonetheless.
Henk-Jan Brinkman Senior Adviser for Food Policy United Nations World Food Program
The third meeting of the Governing Body (GB3) of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture takes place June 1-5 in Tunis. The Contracting Parties will spend some of their time reviewing the confident first steps they have taken toward establishing a multilateral system (MSL) that guarantees open access to plant genetic resources and sharing of the benefits arising from the use of those resources. Then they will have to turn to a more problematic discussion – how to secure the funding and political commitment needed to keep the Treaty on track.
The Treaty’s primary accomplishment to date is keeping the genebank doors open. After decades of squabbling over ownership rights in the world’s plant genetic resources for food and agriculture (PGRFA), the entry into force of the Treaty in 2004 established a secure framework of legal rights and obligations for both the genebanks that provide PGRFA for research and breeding, and for the researchers and breeders who need access to materials located in other countries in order to continue to improve crop varieties, and ultimately, agricultural productivity. The 12 government-funded International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) holding plant germplasm collections were the first to place their materials in the MLS and to start using the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA), the licensing agreement that contains the Treaty’s benefit-sharing requirements. Four other international institutions, eleven countries, and two private breeders’ associations have also notified the secretariat of materials being made available under the MLS. Over 100,000 seed samples annually are now being distributed under the MLS.
The weakness in these impressive statistics is the paucity of Treaty members who have taken the necessary steps to make their PGRFA available under the MLS. The eleven members who are making material available under the MLS represent less than 10 percent of the Treaty’s 120 members. Fortunately for the research community, the IARC collections represent the majority of the unique PGRFA collected ex situ and the eleven countries participating in the MLS hold some important collections. It should also be noted that the Agricultural Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, which holds one of the world’s largest collections, continues to provide access to materials from its collection free of charge to anyone who requests them even though the United States is not a party to the Treaty.
A number of developing countries have requested technical and financial assistance to implement the MLS. Some countries appear to be following a more deliberate strategy of non-implementation while they await the outcome of the ABS negotiations at the CBD Conference of the Parties in Nagoya in 2010. For some countries, perhaps a majority of those that have not implemented, it may be that the Treaty is simply not a priority.
Whatever the reasons behind it, non-implementation threatens to undo the Treaty’s grand political bargain: facilitated access to the world’s genetic resources in exchange for sharing of the benefits, both monetary and non-monetary. While it is widely acknowledged that access itself is one of the chief benefits, it is time for governments to also accept that without funding access won’t expand beyond what it is now. Funding is needed to provide technical assistance and capacity building to those countries without adequate resources to identify, conserve, characterize, utilize and make available the PGRFA within their borders. Because of the long time horizon for the development and commercialization of new varieties, the royalty scheme on seed sales contained in the SMTA will not generate enough revenue quickly enough to provide adequate levels of technical assistance and capacity building. Nor will it overcome the skepticism of those who think they will get a better deal out of the CBD ABS negotiations.
What is needed is direct financial support from individual contracting parties. The countries in a position to provide support can maintain flexibility in the level and means of their financial commitments by providing voluntary contributions. If the funding is spent wisely, i.e., on technical assistance, capacity building and information technology needed to implement the MLS, it can bring more countries into the fold of the MLS and expand open access to the world’s PGRFA. Current levels of access to PGRFA may be adequate to meet today’s needs, but with the specter of climate change looming over the global food security situation, we would be foolish not to open up access as much as possible.
Influential voices in the international agriculture community are calling for agriculture to be put on the negotiating agenda of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December (see e.g., IFPRI and FAO). The linkages between agriculture and climate change are clear. Climate change will impact where, when and how food is produced. For developing countries, a substantial share of the expected economic impact of climate change is attributable to declining agricultural production. Consequently, agriculture needs to be a primary consideration in adaptation to climate change. Agriculture also has the potential to contribute to mitigation of climate change through both emissions reduction and carbon sequestration. It has been estimated that 74% of greenhouse gas emissions from the agricultural sector originates in developing countries. Similarly, 70% of the mitigation potential in the agricultural sector can be realized in developing countries, primarily through soil carbon sequestration.
How might agriculture be incorporated into the Copenhagen agenda? The commitments in the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol include emission reduction targets, market mechanisms to facilitate achieving the emissions targets, and an adaptation fund to assist developing countries. The scope and nature of the post-Kyoto regime to be negotiated in Copenhagen is still unclear, but it will undoubtedly incorporate these three elements in some form. Emissions targets have not been sector specific, so there is no distinctive role for agriculture in discussions on new emissions targets. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the market mechanisms largely exclude agriculture; under a new or revised regime agricultural activities could be allowed to generate credits or offsets under the market mechanisms. The adaptation fund is one area within the current framework in which agricultural projects and programs are included, but the level of financial assistance available for adaptation in the agricultural sector is likely to be an issue in Copenhagen.
In recent comments to the Committee on Sustainable Development, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer identified “new, sufficient and predictable financing for NAMAs (nationally appropriate mitigation actions) and adaptation” as an important agriculture-related issue for discussion in Copenhagen. According to FAO Assistant Director-General Alexander Mueller, financing and incentive schemes are necessary to realize the mitigation potential of agriculture in developing countries, along with the measurement, reporting and verification methodologies upon which such schemes depend. It appears, therefore, that including agriculture in the Copenhagen agenda will largely involve a discussion of how to finance mitigation and adaptation for the agricultural sector in developing countries.
Compared to the scope and complexity of the climate change-agriculture nexus, the Copenhagen agenda is limited. The UNFCCC, as the premier global forum on climate change, can draw the world’s attention to the relationship between climate change and agriculture, and would be remiss in not doing so. Through the inclusion of agricultural sector activities in the market mechanisms it can also provide incentives and financing for the investments necessary to improve food security in the face of climate change. However, a broad range of issues in the climate change-agriculture nexus will have to be addressed outside of the UNFCCC framework. Nor can the UNFCCC be the sole or even the largest source of financing for mitigation and adaptation in the agricultural sector. What we can hope for in Copenhagen is a stamp of legitimacy for the critical role of agriculture and food security in the global response to climate change.
In a column published this week in the New York Times, David Brooks ponders the role of international organizations in dealing with a global crisis, which is what the current swine flu outbreak will become if it turns into a pandemic. Brooks argues that decentralized response capabilities will be more effective than a response coordinated by an international organization (such as WHO in the case of swine flu). He gives the decentralized response three advantages over global coordination: speed, flexibility, and credibility.
This is a debate worth engaging, and a good starting point is another pandemic threat, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). When HPAI first appeared in southeast Asia in late 2003, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization in coordination with the World Organization for Animal Health provided the first comprehensive response. The affected countries had neither the capability nor the resources to deal with the bird flu outbreak without assistance. FAO and OIE, at the invitation of the countries, stepped in to help develop national strategies for disease control and eradication. Over the past 5 years these two international organizations have led a sustained effort to prevent and control HPAI based on a global strategy that includes surveillance, emergency preparedness, and capacity building to improve veterinary infrastructures.
Evaluations of the FAO/OIE response have shown their efforts to be effective, though not perfect. Would a decentralized response have been speedier, more flexible and more credible? The answer is almost certainly, no. Many countries simply do not have the capability to respond to a crisis such as HPAI without external assistance. Yet, neither do FAO and OIE have either the resources or the authority to take over from national governments the primary responsibility for responding to a disease outbreak. They cannot, for example, send in a team to provide assistance without an invitation from the national government.
The international organizations have not been the only ones responding to HPAI. Many donor countries have provided technical assistance and financial resources to affected and at-risk countries. Sometimes, though, their assistance is more well-intentioned than effective. Shortly after HPAI was first reported in Turkey, FAO was invited to send an evaluation team, whose visit was immediately followed by overlapping evaluation teams from two large donors. Turkish veterinary officials were so overwhelmed with managing visitors that they had little time left to manage the crisis. Greater coordination of these efforts was clearly warranted, but all too often coordination for the international organizations means “give us the money and we will decide what needs to be done.”
The lesson to be learned from the HPAI experience is that we need strong international institutions, especially, but not solely, to assist countries with inadequate resources and capabilities to deal with crisis situations that threaten food security. Technical experts in international organizations can provide neutral, credible advice that government leaders can use to defend difficult decisions, such as destroying a farmer’s livelihood in order to control a disease. International organizations can and should do much more to coordinate the international response in a crisis. They operate early warning and reporting networks. They provide a forum for global planning and strategy development. These are all crucial roles international organizations can play to support, not diminish, the primary responsibility of national governments to respond to a crisis. When the stake is a global pandemic, multilateralism serves our self-interests.
The G8 Agriculture Ministers, after meeting in Cison de Valmarino, Italy, from April 18-20, 2009, issued a final declaration today. The declaration covers much of the same ground as the Rome Declaration, the Comprehensive Framework for Action, and the Madrid Statement, but identifies a couple of issues that will be the focus of more intensive discussion in coming months.
- “We call upon the relevant international institutions to examine whether a system of stockholding could be effective in dealing with humanitarian emergencies or as a means to limit price volatility. They should specifically examine the feasibility and the administrative modalities of such a system. In light of this outcome it will be examined whether further steps should be envisaged and whether a consultation process should be established.” The idea of a global grains stock scheme is fraught with complications, both economic and political. This won’t be an easy one upon which to reach consensus.
- The declaration expresses support for the Global Partnership, a concept that first emerged at the Hokaido G8 Summit, but there doesn’t appear to be much progress toward agreement on how the GP would operate and what its objectives would be.
- Overseas investment in farmland has become a hot topic over the past year. The declaration doesn’t tackle the issue directly, but the Financial Times reports that FAO and the World Bank both indicated they would be taking further action. FAO wants to hold a meeting on farmland investment during the summer. The World Bank intends to publish a code of conduct in the near future.
The meeting of G8 agriculture ministers concluding today in northern Italy fulfills a commitment made at the G8 Summit in Hokkaido, Japan in July 2008. The G8 leaders instructed agriculture ministers to “hold a meeting to contribute to developing sound proposals on global food security.” The full G8 Leaders Statement on Global Food Security is available in the Reading Room. The G8 Agriculture Ministers statement will be posted there as well once it is available.
The G8 effort to assert some leadership on the global food security issue needs to be seen in the context of the broader effort to develop coherent policy responses to the global food crisis. Here is a brief chronology of major events:
- UN Chief Executives Board meets (April 28-29, 2008) – In a meeting with the 27 heads of UN agencies, funds and programs, Secretary General Ban Ki Moon establishes the Task Force on the Global Food Crisis to be headed by UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes and Senior UN System Influenza Coordinator David Nabarro.
- FAO High Level Conference on World Food Security: the Challenges of Climate Change and Biofuels (June 3-5, 2008) – The conference, attended by heads of government, ministers, and other high-level officials from 181 countries adopts a declaration (available in the Reading Room) calling for short-, medium-, and long-term action to address the multiple causes of the global food crisis.
- UN Task Force (July 2008) – The Task Force releases the Comprehensive Framework for Action (available in the Reading Room) calling for short-term relief for those suffering from the food crisis and long-term investments and policy reforms to improve food security and resilience of people at risk from food insecurity.
- Madrid High-Level Meeting on Food Security for All (January 26-27, 2009) – The statement (available in the Reading Room) was issued by the Chair, not agreed by the participants. The meeting discussed but did not agree to the establishment of a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition
The global food crisis that seized the attention of world leaders, the public and the press in 2008 is a reminder of just how much we take for granted when it comes to our food supply. The sharp spike in commodity prices increased food import bills for economically distressed developing countries, led to political unrest, and pushed up the number of hungry people in the world from 850 million to 925 million. If last year’s food crisis demonstrated the world’s food security vulnerabilities to an unsuspecting audience, the economic crisis that shoved it off of the global stage proved how short our attention span can be, especially when it comes to dealing with long-term problems. Unlike the economic crisis, which hopefully will be only a distasteful memory in a couple of years, the threats to food security will play out over decades. Even with a decline in commodity prices from their 2008 peaks, the vulnerabilities revealed by the crisis have not disappeared: The number of people who are food insecure has not declined; climate change still threatens to alter global food production capabilities in ways we do not fully comprehend.; the demand for biofuels as an alternative to fossil fuels continues to grow. Given these challenges, it would be unwise to view 2008 as an anomaly. Rather, it should energize us to find solutions to the challenges of food security, both short-term and long-term.
The first lesson we should take away from the global food crisis of 2008 is that food security is a global concern. Food security has conventionally been perceived as a poverty-related problem endemic to certain parts of the world. Last year’s crisis demonstrated that economic inter-dependence has advanced to the point that food insecurity anywhere in the world affects us all. If global food security can be disrupted by supply shortages and price spikes under current conditions, what can we expect as the global population approaches ten billion people by 2050 and climate change affects where, when and how food is produced? Preparing for this challenge requires long-term investments in science, technology, institutions and people.
The purpose of this forum is to provide a space for bringing together the multitude of disciplines that contribute to feeding the world and for sharing the knowledge, expertise, insights and innovations necessary to ensure an abundant and sustainable food supply for all current and future inhabitants of this planet.